EU Labour Productivity & Unit Labour Costs
Annual nominal unit labour cost growth and labour productivity for EU27 and major member states, sourced from Eurostat national accounts data (ESA 2010).
Data
| Year | EU27 | Germany | France | Italy | Spain |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | +3.3% | +4.4% | +1.6% | +3.5% | +4.2% |
| 2024 | +4.7% | +5.3% | +2.3% | +4.4% | +3.4% |
| 2023 | +6.9% | +8.0% | +3.9% | +3.8% | +5.9% |
| 2022 | +3.4% | +3.8% | +4.5% | +0.9% | +2.1% |
| 2021 | -0.2% | -0.6% | +0.8% | -1.0% | +0.8% |
| 2020 | +4.3% | +3.7% | +4.2% | +3.2% | +8.2% |
| 2019 | +1.8% | +3.1% | -0.9% | +1.5% | +4.1% |
| 2018 | +1.9% | +3.2% | +0.9% | +1.8% | +1.5% |
| 2017 | +1.0% | +1.3% | +1.1% | +0.1% | +0.5% |
| 2016 | +0.8% | +1.4% | +1.0% | +0.5% | -0.8% |
| 2015 | 0.0% | +2.0% | +0.3% | +0.8% | 0.0% |
| 2014 | +0.3% | +1.6% | +0.9% | +0.3% | -0.3% |
| 2013 | +1.1% | +2.3% | +1.4% | +0.8% | -0.9% |
About this Dataset
Nominal unit labour costs across the EU27 rose +3.3% in 2025, decelerating for a second consecutive year after the post-COVID wage acceleration peak of +6.9% in 2023 and +4.7% in 2024. The reading still stands well above the 2010–2019 average of +1.0% per year, reflecting a structural shift in European wage dynamics as historically tight labour markets drove catch-up compensation gains. Germany, long the anchor of Eurozone cost discipline, recorded +4.4% ULC growth in 2025 (provisional), down from +5.3% in 2024 but still above its pre-2022 norm, while France cooled more sharply to +1.6% from +2.3% in 2024.
The EU27 nominal ULC index (per hour worked) reached 130.3 in 2025 (2015=100), meaning that average labour costs per unit of output have risen 30.3% since the base year. Growth has decelerated in each of the past two years, from +6.7% year-on-year in 2023 to +4.6% in 2024 and +3.2% in 2025 on the index measure, indicating that the dominant driver of ULC acceleration since 2022 — nominal wage growth outpacing productivity — is easing rather than reversing.
The data is sourced from Eurostat's TESEM170 and TIPSLM20 datasets, which are derived from the European System of Accounts (ESA 2010) national accounts framework. ULC is calculated as the ratio of total labour compensation to real GDP at constant prices, ensuring that the measure reflects changes in the cost of producing a unit of economic output rather than merely tracking wage levels in isolation. The series covers all EU27 member states annually from 2005, with most series running from 1995 under the TIPSLM20 index.
- Measurement: Nominal ULC = total labour compensation (wages + employer social contributions) ÷ real GDP output
- Base year: 2015 = 100 for the index series (TIPSLM20); YoY growth rates from TESEM170
- Frequency: Annual; quarterly data available via NAMQ_10_LP_ULC for intra-year monitoring
- Geography: EU27 aggregate, Eurozone (EA20), and all 27 individual member states
- Revisions: Eurostat marks provisional observations (
p) which are typically revised at the September national accounts update
The divergence between Germany and southern Eurozone members over 2005–2015 remains the most consequential episode in the dataset. Between 2005 and 2008, Spanish ULC rose by a cumulative +17.6% against Germany's flat profile (0.0% cumulatively) — a gap that could not be resolved by currency depreciation within the monetary union. The subsequent Spanish adjustment from 2010 to 2016, when ULC fell or was flat for seven consecutive years, represents one of the sharpest internal devaluations in modern economic history and provides the benchmark for how Eurozone competitiveness adjustment actually works in the absence of an exchange rate instrument. Post-2022, ULC growth has converged across major economies, though Germany's +4.4% in 2025 runs ahead of both France's +1.6% and Spain's +4.2% — a reversal of the 2005–2008 relationship, when Germany recorded the lowest cumulative ULC growth of the group.
For fixed-income and macro analysts, the persistence of EU ULC growth above 4% through 2023–2024 provided the empirical foundation for the ECB's protracted tightening cycle and explains the delayed pace of subsequent easing relative to the Federal Reserve. Real labour productivity per hour worked in the EU27 fell −0.8% in 2023 and rose only +0.3% in 2024, meaning that most ULC expansion in those years reflected nominal wage gains rather than efficiency-driven cost absorption. Productivity growth picked up to +1.4% in 2025, which helped slow ULC growth, but weak productivity remains the medium-term structural challenge underlying ECB and European Commission competitiveness assessments.