Italy (2024)
67.1
% of population (20–64)
+0.8pp YoY
YoY Change
+0.8pp
percentage points
Trend
up
Series length
20
years of data

Data

Year% of population (20–64)YoY Change
202467.1+0.8pp
202366.3+1.5pp
202264.8+2.1pp
202162.7+0.2pp
202062.5-1.1pp
201963.6+0.6pp
201863+0.7pp
201762.3+0.7pp
201661.6+1.1pp
201560.5+0.6pp
201459.9+0.2pp
201359.7-1.2pp
201260.9-0.1pp
201161+0pp
201061-0.6pp
200961.6-1.3pp
200862.9+0.2pp
200762.7+0.3pp
200662.4+0.9pp
200561.5n/a

About this Dataset

The Italy Employment Rate measures the share of persons aged 20–64 in employment, published annually by Eurostat from the EU Labour Force Survey (LFSA_ERGAN). The 2024 reading of 67.1% is the highest in the 20-year series, yet Italy remains the lowest-employment major economy in the EU-27 — 11 percentage points below Germany and well short of the EU's 2030 target of 78%.

The critical distinction for Italy's labour market is between unemployment and inactivity. Italy's harmonised unemployment rate (6.1%) is modest, broadly in line with France. But Italy's employment rate (67.1%) is vastly lower than France's (75.1%) because a much larger share of Italy's working-age population is economically inactive — neither employed nor seeking work. This distinction matters for policy analysis: an unemployed person is registered, job-seeking, and typically covered by benefits; an inactive person is completely outside the formal labour market, often not captured by benefit systems, and far harder to mobilise. Italy's inactivity problem is concentrated among women (especially outside major cities), youth, and workers in the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy and islands), where cultural factors and inadequate childcare infrastructure create barriers that nominal job creation cannot easily overcome.

The improvement from 59.7% in 2013 to 67.1% in 2024 is the result of Italy's most sustained period of labour market improvement in modern history. Three drivers stand out: the Jobs Act (2015) reduced dismissal costs for new permanent hires, tilting incentives away from temporary contracts; post-COVID services demand absorbed workers across hospitality, healthcare, and logistics; and PNRR (the Italian implementation of EU Next Generation EU funds) has financed a construction and infrastructure wave that has directly created employment. However, Italy's challenge is structural: closing even half of the gap to Germany's employment rate would require mobilising approximately 4 million additional workers — overwhelmingly women in the south — an endeavour that goes beyond macro stimulus into deep institutional reform of childcare, tax, and benefit design.

Coverage and methodology: Eurostat compiles the annual employment rate from EU LFS microdata (LFSA_ERGAN), using the ILO employment definition (one hour or more of paid work in the reference week). The 20–64 age range aligns with the EU Employment Strategy target group. Italy's ISTAT provides the underlying data; ISTAT publishes monthly employment estimates that are generally consistent with the annual Eurostat figures. Annual revisions occur with each new survey wave.

Frequently Asked Questions

Eurostat's Italy employment rate measures the share of persons aged 20–64 in employment, compiled annually from the EU Labour Force Survey (dataset LFSA_ERGAN). At 67.1% in 2024 — the highest in the series but the lowest among major EU economies — Italy's rate is 10 percentage points below Germany (81.3%) and 11 points below the EU's 2030 target of 78%. The gap is primarily explained by high structural inactivity, not by unemployment: a large share of Italy's working-age population — particularly women and workers in the Mezzogiorno — are neither employed nor seeking employment, placing them outside the active population entirely.
Italy's female employment rate is structurally among the lowest in the EU, pulling the gender-averaged rate well below Germany's and France's. The drivers are well-documented: limited and costly childcare provision outside major northern cities forces many women to exit the labour force after childbirth; cultural norms, particularly in southern regions, continue to associate primary caregiving with women; and Italy's tax system has historically penalised dual-earner couples through household income aggregation rules. The PNRR allocates funding to childcare expansion, which may incrementally improve female participation over 2022–2026, but structural change in this dimension has been historically slow.
Italy's employment rate being 10 percentage points below Germany's represents a substantial economic opportunity cost. Each percentage point of employment rate improvement — mobilising approximately 300,000 additional workers — adds directly to GDP and to payroll tax revenues, reducing the structural primary deficit that has been central to Italy's sovereign debt challenge for decades. Italy's debt/GDP ratio above 140% is sustainable only under favourable growth and interest rate conditions; structural improvements in employment, particularly in the south, are the primary lever available for organic fiscal consolidation. For investors, Italy's employment gap is a long-duration option on structural reform — one that has been partially in-the-money since the Jobs Act but remains far from fully exercised.
The series trough of 59.7% in 2013 reflected the cumulative impact of two recessions (2008–2009 GFC and 2011–2013 euro crisis), which reduced employment more in Italy than in most peers due to Italy's higher exposure to the sovereign debt crisis and its rigid pre-reform labour market. The subsequent recovery to 67.1% by 2024 — an 11-year, 7.4pp improvement — represents Italy's strongest sustained employment expansion since reunification. Drivers include the Jobs Act reform, the post-COVID services rebound, and PNRR-funded construction and infrastructure activity. However, Italy's pace of improvement remains slower than Spain's over the same period, reflecting deeper structural constraints.