United Kingdom Inflation Rate (CPI, Annual %) (2024)
United Kingdom's Inflation Rate (CPI, Annual %): 3.3 % annual change in 2024, -3.5pp YoY. World Bank (FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG), 1990–2024.
Data
| Year | % annual change | YoY Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 3.3 | -3.5pp |
| 2023 | 6.8 | -1.1pp |
| 2022 | 7.9 | +5.4pp |
| 2021 | 2.5 | +1.5pp |
| 2020 | 1 | -0.7pp |
| 2019 | 1.7 | -0.6pp |
| 2018 | 2.3 | -0.3pp |
| 2017 | 2.6 | +1.5pp |
| 2016 | 1 | +0.6pp |
| 2015 | 0.4 | -1.1pp |
| 2014 | 1.5 | -0.8pp |
| 2013 | 2.3 | -0.3pp |
| 2012 | 2.6 | -1.3pp |
| 2011 | 3.9 | +1.4pp |
| 2010 | 2.5 | +0.5pp |
| 2009 | 2 | -1.6pp |
| 2008 | 3.5 | +1.1pp |
| 2007 | 2.4 | -0.1pp |
| 2006 | 2.5 | +0.4pp |
| 2005 | 2.1 | n/a |
About this Dataset
The United Kingdom Inflation Rate measures the annual percentage change in the consumer price index as compiled by the ONS and published by the World Bank in its standardised global development indicators. The 2024 reading of 3.3% — down sharply from 7.9% in 2022 but still 1.3 percentage points above the BoE's 2% statutory target — reflects a disinflation process that has been faster than Germany's in pace but slower in arriving at target, primarily because UK services inflation has proven stickier than goods inflation throughout the post-energy-shock normalisation.
The 2022 UK inflation episode — the country's most acute since the credit-boom peak of 8.1% in 1990 — shared the same global energy shock origin as Germany, France, and other European peers, but was amplified by two UK-specific factors. First, sterling's relative weakness (the pound depreciated against both the dollar and euro in the 2022 period) raised the cost of imported goods and energy denominated in foreign currencies, creating a pass-through channel that euro-area members do not face. Second, Ofgem's energy price cap mechanism — while protecting consumers from the worst of spot market spikes — created a delayed and irregular pass-through of wholesale prices into household bills, extending the inflation episode beyond what market-based energy pricing might have produced. The result was UK CPI remaining above 5% from mid-2022 through mid-2023, a longer duration than the comparable German episode. The post-Brexit structural shift in labour supply compounds the services inflation problem: sectors including hospitality, social care, food processing, and transport have faced persistent labour shortages that were previously addressed through EU free movement, and these shortages have sustained wage growth above the level consistent with 2% services inflation.
For gilt investors and BoE watchers, the critical distinction in the 2024–2025 period is between headline CPI (3.3%, visible and declining) and services CPI (typically running 4.5–5.5%, declining more slowly). The BoE's Monetary Policy Committee has been explicit that it will not accelerate easing until services inflation shows a durable decline toward the level consistent with 2% headline CPI — broadly 3.5–4% services inflation. This conditionality keeps the BoE's easing pace slower than the ECB's even where headline rates converge, with implications for the UK-EU rate differential and sterling valuation. For corporate treasury functions and real asset investors, UK inflation at 3.3% with a trajectory toward — but not yet at — 2% implies real interest rates in the UK are positive and likely to remain so through 2025, compressing valuation multiples in rate-sensitive sectors.
Coverage and methodology: The World Bank compiles this series from ONS CPI data (FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG), applying harmonised methodology for cross-country comparison. The series covers 1990–2024 at annual frequency. The UK's headline CPI differs from RPI (Retail Prices Index), which uses a higher-level arithmetic formula and historically reads 1–2pp above CPI; RPI remains the basis for legacy index-linked gilt coupons but is no longer the ONS's preferred headline inflation measure. CPIH (which adds owner-occupier housing costs) is the ONS's national statistics measure but is not the statutory BoE target series.